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LEGAL REPRESENTATION AND
THE PROPOSED YOUNG PERSONS
IN CONFICT WITH THE LAW A CT
By

KATHERINE CATTON*

and
JEFFREY S. LEoN**

A.

INTRODUCTION
At the outset of its Report' on proposals for new legislation to replace
our Juvenile Delinquents Act,2 the Solicitor General's Committee is critical of
the traditional approach to juvenile justice in Canada, in that "while espousing

help, and understanding of the problems experienced by young persons, this
approach has not totally avoided the development of characteristics similar to

the adult criminal process ....[E]lements such as deterrence, punishment, detention and the resulting stigma have surfaced in the juvenile justice process
despite initial intentions to the contrary."3 The Report suggests that a major
component of reform will be the recognition of "sufficient substantive and
procedural safeguards" 4 for children involved in the court process. Central to
concerns with providing effective legal rights must be, of necessity, considerations of how these rights are to be enforced, and, in this regard, the availability
of legal representation for children is crucial. Thus, it is with a view to
evaluating the adequacy of provisions for representation that the draft Young
Persons in Conflict with the Law Act will be reviewed. In conclusion, an
analysis of alternative systems of representation, both current and proposed,
will be presented.
B.

CURRENT DELINQUENCY LEGISLATION AND RIGHTS
ACKNOWLEDGED THEREUNDER

The Juvenile Delinquents Act itself does not refer to rights of children
generally and no section deals specifically with the idea of legal representation
for children. "Theoretically," however, claim Fox and Spencer, "the pro0 Copyright, 1977, Katherine Catton and Jeffrey S. Leon.
Legal Research Co-ordinator, Child in the City Project, University of Toronto,
Toronto, Canada.
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' Report of the Solicitor General's Committee on Proposals for New Legislation
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(Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975).
2 R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-3.
3 Supra, note I at 3.
4 Id.
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cedural rights of a child charged with the offence of delinquency under present
law are equal to those granted to adults." 5 The authors cite, in this regard, the

Bill of Rights6 as offering the "promise of a variety of safeguards including
freedom from cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, and the right to a
fair hearing 'in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice for the
determination of... rights and obligations.' "M "Similarly," they continue:
The Canada Evidence Act also applies to juvenile proceedings except where expressly excluded (s. 4(2)). Under section 5(1) of the Juvenile Delinquents Act
prosecutions and trials are declared to be summary in nature and are to be
governed, mutatis mutandis, by the provisions of the Code relating to summary
convictions insofar as they are applicable. This includes, for instance, the requirement that a plea be taken, and a statement of the accused's rights to examine and
cross-examine witnesses under oath (s. 736 and s. 737).8

In the course of defining the limits of the juvenile's rights under the
Juvenile Delinquents Act, a substantial body of case law has developed which

provides the child with several of the due process protections accorded to an
adult. The procedural problem has been one of reconciling s. 5 of the Act
which states that the prosecutions are to be summary in nature, with both ss.
17 and 38 of the Act. Section 17 allows for proceedings to be "as informal as
the circumstances will permit, consistent with a due regard for a proper administration of justice." It further prevents the quashing or setting aside of
an adjudication or other action of a juvenile court "because of any informality
or irregularity where it appears that the disposition of the case was in the best
interests of the child."'1 Section 38 requires that the Act be "liberally con5
R. Fox and M. Spencer, The Young Oflender's Bill: Destiginatizing Juvenile
Delinquency? (1972), 14 Crim. L.Q. 172 at 198.
6R.S.C. 1970, Appendix H.
7 Supra, note 5 at 198. Thus far, however, the courts have, in general, been reluctant
to construe the Bill of Rights so as to render sections of the Juvenile Delinquents Act
inoperative: Re Regina and M (1973), 15 C.C.C. (2d) 214 at 216-17 (Ont. H. C.,
Houlden J.) dealing with s. 9(1) (transfer); R. v. 0. (1972), 6 C.C.C. (2d) 385
(B.C.S.C., McIntyre J.) dealing with s. 37(3) (30 day maximum for application for
leave to appeal); Re Dubrule v. The Queen (1974), 19 C.C.C. (2d) 104 (N.W.T.S.C.,
Morrow J.) dealing Nith s. 2(2) (proclaiming upper age limit to be 18 years); In the
Matter of Section 12(1) and (2) of the Juvenile Delinquents Act and Section 2(f) of the
CanadianBill of Rights (Unreported, September 29, 1975, Ont. Prov. Ct., Farn. Div.,
Wang Prov. Ct. J.) (proceedings to be held without publicity). See also R. v. Burnshine
and A.G. for Ontario (1974), 25 C.R.N.S. 270 (S.C.C.) per Martland J. at 280-81 and
per Laskin J. at 287-89. Noteworthy in this regard is the statement of Mr. Justice
Galligan of the Ontario High Court, to the effect that "[tlhere is nothing in the Juvenile
Delinquents Act ... which would abrogate or infringe the fundamental right to counsel
in the case of a minor. Indeed, if there were any such provision, unless it were declared
to operate notwithstanding the Candian Bill of Rights, it would probably be held by the
courts to be inoperative." (citing Brownridge v. The Queen, [1972] S.C.R. 926) P. T.
Galligan, "Protection and Representation of Minors," (Paper presented to the Thirteenth
International Symposium on Comparative Law, Ottawa, October 19, 1975) at 9.
s Supra, note 5 at 198.
) Supra, note 2, s. 17 (1).
'Old., s. 17(2).
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strued in order that its purpose may be carried out, namely, that the care and
custody and discipline of a juvenile delinquent shall approximate as nearly as
may be that which should be given by his parents, and that as far as practicable
every juvenile delinquent shall be treated, not as a criminal, but as a mis-

directed and misguided child, and one needing aid, encouragement, help and
assistance." In Smith v. The Queen, ex. rel. Chmielewski,n the Supreme Court

of Canada overturned the majority decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal,

2

holding that a juvenile has the right to plead to the charge before the

court and to be heard in this regard.' 3 Thus, the rules of criminal procedure
applicable in adult court summary conviction trials are to be used in proceedings under the Juvenile Delinquents Act, 14 despite the provisions for informality.
This body of case law which has emerged under the Juvenile Delinquents
Act spells out the procedural safeguards to which a child in a delinquency
hearing is entitled. 15 In summary, the nature of the offence must be made clear

to the child, 16 who then has the right to make full answer and defence, including the right to cross-examine witnesses, to call witnesses and to testify in
his own behalf (and be sworn if the meaning of the oath is understood).1 A

juvenile also has the right not to give self-incriminating evidence, the right to
require that an alleged statement or confession be excluded in the absence of
proof of voluntariness, and the qualified right not to be questioned in the
11 [1959] S.C.R. 638; 124 C.C.C. 71; 30 C.R. 230.
12R. v. Gerald X. (1958), 25 W.W.R. 97.
13

See also R. v. B. (1956), 19 W.W.R. 651; 116 C.C.C. 382 (B.C.S.C., Brown J.);
and R. v. H. and H. (1946), 88 C.C.C. 8; [1947] 3 D.L.R. 564 (B.C.S.C., Mason J.).
14 See generally B. Green, The Determination of Delinquency in the Juvenile Court
of Metropolitan Toronto (unpublished SJ.D. dissertation, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University, 1968); B. Kaliel, Civil Rights in Juvenile Courts (1974), 12 Alta. L. Rev.
341.
15 Adamson CJ.M. dissenting in R. v. Gerald X, supra, note 12 at 113; and Wilson,
J. in R. v. Tillitson (1947), 2 W.W.R. 232; 89 C.C.C. 389 (B.C.S.C.).
16R. v. Tillitson, id. In the words of Wilson J., "I am not concerned with barren
technicalities, but with fundamental rights: rights which we provide for the sorriest
scoundrel tried in our criminal courts, and should accord with double-handed generosity
to an immature lad" (at 234 (W.W.R.); 391 (C.C.C.)).
17 In sentencing, depositions should not be taken in the absence of the juvenile
(R. v. S. (1948), 6 C.R. 292 (N.B.S.C., Harrison J.)). However, after a finding of
delinquency is made, "the ordinary laws with respect to the admissibility of evidence
are relaxed" (Re P., [1973] 2 O.R. 818 (Ont. H.C., Zuber, J.) at 819). The stated rights
are also applicable to transfer hearings under s. 9: R. v. R., [1970] 1 C.C.C. 283
(B.C.S.C., Rae J.); R. v. David, [1972] 6 W.W.R. 611 (B.C.S.C., Anderson J.); and
Re R. v. Arbuckle, [1967] 3 C.C.C. 380 (B.C.C.A., McFarlane J.A.). However, because
a decision with respect to transfer is of an administrative or ministerial nature, the judge
need not be limited to a consideration of sworn statements: R. v. Trodd (No. 1) (1966),
47 C.R. 365 (B.C.S.C., per Aikens J.); Shingoose v. The Queen, [1967] 3 C.C.C. 290
(S.C.C., per Hall J.); R. v. Pagee (No. 2) (1963), 40 C.R. 257 (Man. C.A., per Miller
CJ.M.); and Re R. v. Arbuckle, supra. As to possible limitations on the quality of
evidence, see R. v. Hiri'onen, [1969] 3 C.C.C. 140 (B.C.S.C., Aikins J.).
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absence of a parent or counsel, or without being warned.' 8 Finally, a juvenile
may be convicted only on legally sworn evidence, and is entitled to an open
and fair trial. 19
In a recent effort to deal with the issue of due process protections in delinquency proceedings, Mr. Justice Andrews, of the British Columbia Supreme
Court, held on appeal in R. v. Moore20 that to deny a juvenile the benefit of
the rule in Hodge's Case, by making a finding of delinquency based on circumstantial evidence with the case not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, was
more than an "irregularity" under s. 17. The liberal construction required by
s. 38 was held to have no application until the child was adjudged delinquent.
The following statements by the juvenile court judge in the original proceeding
indicate the confusion surrounding the proper procedure to be followed in
juvenile court proceedings:
•

..

it is better to err on the side of mercy than otherwise and in juvenile court

I am inclined to think that erring on the side of mercy would be to not let juvenile
offenders think that they can get away with these offences... (while) at the adult
level I might have to have found otherwise .

. .,

it would be wrong for a young

person to think that he can take advantage of technical defences that are of,
perhaps, more use at an adult level than here where the result of a finding of
guilty is an effort on the part of our workers to help re-direct a young person
into a better way of living and spending his time.2 '

In response, Mr. Justice Andrews referred to the case of R. v. B.,22 in which
it was stated that "case law has always been to the effect that informal procedure may never be used in such a way as to prejudice the rights of an accused person." Essentially then, although a "liberal interpretation" of the Act
may have relevance at the disposition stage of the proceedings, a juvenile is
entitled not to have his rights prejudiced by informal proceedings. He is therefore entitled to certain due process protections during adjudication.
Why these due process rights and protections are seldom acknowledged
in the actual proceedings of the juvenile court is in part a function of the
philosophy underlying this court. Canadian delinquency legislation is based
on the family model of the criminal process. The central premise of the family

model philosophy is a "reconcilability of interests between the state and the
18 A conviction on the sole basis of an ambiguous confession that is taken in
objectionable circumstances, and the truth of which is denied at trial, may be sufficient
cause to grant leave to appeal and to quash a conviction. (R. v. M., [1975] 7 O.R. (2d)
490 (Ont. H.C., per Grange J.)). "Mhe inherent vulnerability of the child when ...
dealing with older persons in authority" renders the absence or inadequacy of a caution,
or the absence of parents or a person in loco parentis when a statement is taken, particularly critical (R. v. R. (No. 1) (1972), 9 C.C.C. (2d) 274 (Ont. Prov. Ct., (Fam.
Div.), per Thomson Prov. Ct. J.) at 275). However, the presence of a parent or a person
in loco parentis is not an absolute reuirement (Re A., [1975] 5 W.W.R. 425 (Alta., S.C.,
per Shannon J.)). See generally, W. H. Fox, Confessions by Juveniles (1963), 5 Crim.
L.Q. 459.
19 However, the same does not hold true for the admissibility of evidence for purposes20of disposition and transfer. See cases supra,note 17.
R. v. Moore (1974), 22 C.C.C. (2d) 189.
2

1 Id. at 191.

22

1d.

at 192. R. v. B., supra, note 13 at 652 (W.W.R.); 383 (C.C.C.).

1977]

Representationof Children

accused" just as there is a reconcilability of interests between a parent and
child within the idealized family structure. In this model, a parent always acts
in a manner consistent with the basic well-being of his child.23 Similarly, the
goal of our Juvenile Delinquents Act is to treat the particular child before the
court in a manner consistent with his basic well-being. Section 3 (2) of the
Act states that "where a child is adjudged to have committed a delinquency
he shall be dealt with, not as an offender, but as one in a condition of delinquency and therefore requiring help and guidance and proper supervision."
Hence all the proceedings are geared towards determining and acting upon
what will in the end prove best for the child. Unfortunately, the legislation
sets out no principles to guide the judge in this determination. As illustrated
in the above quote from the trial judgment in R. v. Moore, procedural niceties,
when they are thought to interfere with this "best interests" goal, are frequently shunted aside despite the fact that there are often as many different
views of what24is best for the child as there are participants in the juvenile
court hearing.
Some suggest that the child gains from a process in which his legal rights
are not given full recognition and protection though there appears to be no
empirical support for this view. Mr. Justice McRuer, for example, has argued
that "strict adherence to the procedure of the ordinary courts might well work
to the detriment of the child. The function of the judge is not so much to determine guilt as to find out the underlying causes which have brought the child
before the court, and when these have been determined to prescribe treatment."125 In his view, while "some basic" legal protections require recognition,
the function of the judge, as "a social physician charged with diagnosing the
case and issuing the prescription. . . cannot be properly performed if he is
surrounded by too many legalistic trappings." 26 It is only when one questions
whether the outcome of juvenile delinquency proceedings in fact functions in
the child's best interests, and sees that it often does not achieve this goal, that
consideration must be given to whether greater emphasis on protecting the
child's basic rights in this forum is required. 27
It has been argued28 that, although juvenile court proceedings supposedly
operate on a family model of criminal procedure," when carefully scrutinized
they in fact more closely resemble what Herbert Packer labels a crime control
23

J. Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or A Third 'Model of the Criminal

Process' (1969), 79 Yale L.J. 359 at 372-73.
24 1.Dootjes, P. Erickson and R. Fox, Defense Counsel in Juvenile Court: A Variety
of Roles (1972), 14 Can. J. of Crim. and Corr. 132 at 141 et seq.
25
Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights (Report 1, Vol. 2), (Toronto:

Queen's Printer, 1968) at 554-55.
26 Id.
2

7E. Schur, Radical Non-Intervention (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall,
1973); W. Stapleton and L. Teitlebaum, In Defense of Youth: A Study of the Role of

Counsel in American Juvenile Courts (New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 1972).
28 K. Catton, Models of Procedure and the Juvenile Courts (1976), 18 Crim. L.

181.
29 See supra, note 23.

Q.
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model of criminal procedure. 0 Under a crime control model, procedural protections are abrogated not so that what is in the best interests of the accused
can be readily accomplished, but rather, so that criminal behaviour may be
repressed in as expeditious a manner as possible. The most important function
of the criminal process from this philosophical vantage point is to achieve fast,
final and efficient convictions of those who are "probably guilty." Speed is
obtained by using uniform and routine procedures; finality, by minimizing the
opportunity to challenge the process; and efficiency, by screening out those
who are "probably innocent" early-on through a pre-judicial fact-finding
process. An analysis of the current procedures used in the Metropolitan
Toronto juvenile courts has indicated a close parallel to those set out in the
crime control model of criminal procedure. 3 '
Those rights and protections which have been developed in the case law
are often ignored in the rare cases where counsel is even aware that many
standard procedural protections apply in this forum. Why is it that rights
which exist in law are not enforced in the juvenile courts? It would seem that
either the absence of legal representation, or when present, the absence of
adequate legal representation, is the prime factor that accounts for the continued neglect in enforcing these due process protections in delinquency
hearings.
The Ontario Legal Aid Plan has, since 1966, provided duty counsel to
represent juveniles appearing in juvenile court. By Regulation 55732 under the
Legal Aid Act, 3 duty counsel is charged as follows:

69. Where a person has been taken into custody or summoned and charged with
an offence, he may obtain before any appearance to the charge the assistance
of duty counsel who shall,
a) advise him of his rights and take such steps as the circumstances require
to protect his rights, including representing him on an application for
remand or adjournment or for bail or on the entering of a plea of guilty
and making representations with respect to sentence where a plea of
guilty is entered. . .84

Further, the regulations provide that:
37. An area director may require that an application for legal aid for an infant
be made on his behalf by his parent or guardian, when the circumstances
appear to so justify.85

By this means, a juvenile may, by himself or through his parents, retain
a private lawyer under the legal aid scheme to represent him at his hearing.
A minor has no independent right under the present Legal Aid Act to apply
for assistance should his parents refuse to do so for him when the area director
requires that they, rather than the child himself, make the application. Where
30 H.

31

Packer, Two Models of the CriminalProcess (1964), 113 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1.

Supra, note 28 at 195-98.
32
R.R.O. 1970.
33R.S.O. 1970, c. 239, as am. by S.O. 1973, c. 50. See generally W. T. Little, A
Guarantee of Legal Rights of Children Through Legal Aid (1970), 4 Gazette 217.
34 Id., s. 69.
35 Id., s. 37.
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a conflict exists between the parent and child, it is possible that the child may
be unable to obtain legal representation.8 6
In Toronto, duty counsel arrives at juvenile court approximately one
hour before the hearings commence, obtains the list of cases from the court
clerk, and proceeds to interview either the parent or child or both. A recent
study37 indicates that this representation by duty counsel is totally inadequate.
Although some individuals perform a meaningful role, this appeared to be
more a function of personality than legal training. In the sample studied, many
children had no idea who duty counsel was, or that he was a lawyer who was
supposed to represent them. Duty counsel often had trouble communicating
with the child and consequently often directed his questions to the parents,
sometimes to the total exclusion of the child. During the actual hearing, duty
counsel usually took no active part, even when confusion arose or clear
breaches of the rules of evidence occurred.
A series of earlier studies provide clues as to why duty counsel is so
ineffective in this forum. A lawyer in juvenile court is under many pressures
from the different participants to perform diametrically opposing roles. 8 His
own training places him in the role of an advocate speaking for his client,
although it may be unclear who his client is when parent-child conflicts arise.
But the philosophy of the juvenile court, with its "best interests of the child"
goal, results in an informal procedure in which the role of advocate becomes
inappropriate. There are strong pressures on the lawyer to modify his role
into that of a social worker, and to see that what is "best" for the child is
done, even when this does not mean acquittal.8 9 A compromise posture duty
counsel can assume is that of an amicus curiae. In this role, duty counsel acts
as an intermediary between the judge, child, caseworkers, and parent, advising
40
all participants on relevant points of law and other matters.
A further source of confusion for duty counsel in the juvenile court is the
lack of a clearly defined prosecutor. Almost every other participant in the
hearing except the child appears to function in this role at some time. Nothing
in the lawyer's training prepares him to deal with such vaguely defined and
often contradictory role expectations. 41 A further study by Eriekson2 of how
judges and social workers view lawyers in the juvenile courts confirms the
lawyers' view of the contradictory role expectations placed upon them. Some

30 See D. Steinberg,

The Young Offender and the Courts (1972), 6 R.F.L. 86.
37 K. Catton and P. Erickson, The Juvenile's Perception of the Role of Defence
Counsel in Juvenile Court: A Pilot Study (Working Paper, Toronto: Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto, 1975).
as Supra, note 24.
3
1 Id. at 143.
40 These are similar to the duties envisioned by the Ontario Law Reform Commission in recommending Law Guardians for court proceedings involving children (see
infra, note 113).
41 p. Erickson, Legalistic and Traditional Role Expectations for Defence Counsel
in Juvenile Court (1975), 17 Can. J. of Crim. and Corr. 78.
42 p. Erickson, The Defence Lawyer's Role in Juvenile Court: An Empirical Investigation into Judges' and Social Workers' Points of View (1974), 24 U.T.LJ. 126.
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judges and social workers indicated that the presence of lawyers was important, some thought it not important at all; some felt they should act in a
highly legalistic manner, and others suggested that the child did not need
anyone to protect his rights, since everyone involved wanted only what was
best for the child."
The above studies also indicated that the private lawyer in juvenile court
experienced much less role conflict than duty counsel, both internally and
from external sources. The private lawyer saw himself as much more of an
advocate representing his client, the child, although this role too was subject
to many conflicting expectations." Again, the absence of a clearly defined
prosecutor made it difficult for the private lawyer to function in a purely
legalistic manner.
In sum, there are a number of operative factors which contribute to the
frequent lack of procedural due process in juvenile courts despite the body of
case law which asserts this right. They include:
1) the procedural informality in this forum;
2) the recent introduction of lawyers into the proceedings;
3) the lack of experience of many juvenile court duty counsel;
4) the inability of children to articulate their position or comprehend
the intricacies of the hearing;
5) the underlying philosophy of the Juvenile Delinquents Act; and
6) the tradition which questions whether children should have "procedural rights" to protect in the first place.
Since the espoused purpose of the juvenile court is to "maintain the
delicate balance of helping children and preserving their rights, while at the
same time protecting society from harmful conduct,"4 it is critical to ask
whether legal representation will further this aim; and if so, what sort of legal
representation will most effectively achieve this goal?
What is needed are lawyers who understand the philosophical basis of
the court without being overwhelmed by it; lawyers who will not succumb to
someone else's perspective of the best interests of the child when the child's
legal rights must be sacrificed to achieve this end. A person's right to procedural due process is one of the most cherished traditions in a democratic
society. It seems unlikely that actions taken on behalf of a child can be in his
best interests when an abridgement of his legal rights is a concomitant part
of the process.
What is needed are lawyers who can communicate effectively with the
child, explain the process to him, inform him of the consequences of certain
events in the hearing, and help him to understand, as far as possible, the
nature and consequences of the process. This assistance is essential to ensure
131 et seq.
Supra, note 41 at 83-85.
45
Supra, note I at 3.
43 Id.at
44
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that the young person can effectively participate in the proceedings should
he so desire.
The proposed Young Persons in Conflict with the Law Act46 gives the

young person the right to be represented by legal counsel or a responsible

adult at all stages of the proceedings. 47 An examination of various sections of
this draft Act will now be undertaken to determine48whether this proposed

legislation adequately protects the rights of the child.
C.

YOUNG PERSONS IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW ACT

The preamble of the Young Persons in Conflict with the Law Act states
that:
Young persons have basic rights and fundamental freedoms no less than those of
adults; a right to special safeguards and assistance in the preservation of those
rights and freedoms and in the application of the principles stated in the Canadian
Bill of Rights and elsewhere; and a right to be heard in the course of, and to
participate in, the processes that lead to decisions that affect them. [emphasis
added]

This is an admirable and sweeping statement that gives recognition to the
rights of young persons in our society. Unfortunately, the substantive provisions of the proposed legislation do little to advance this principle. In fact,
many provisions in this proposed Act detract from, rather than enhance, the
49
legal rights of young persons. Without examining each provision in detail,

some examples of the inadequacies of this legislation will be adumbrated.
1.

Rights to Representation

Section 10(1) of the Young Personsin Conflict with the Law Act states
that "[a] young person is entitled to be assisted by a lawyer . . . during all
46

Id. at 82.

47

id., s. 10.

48 On the general "right" to retain counsel in Canada, see B. A. Grosman, The

Right to Counsel in Canada (1967), 10 Can. Bar J. 189.
49
Supra, note 1 at 7. The Solicitor General's Committee summarized the "major
thrusts of their proposals as follows:
In general terms, the Committee proposes that the new legislation be limited to
provide solely for offences under the Criminal Code and other federal statutes and
regulations.
The proposals also provide for the establishment of a screening agency to
assist in diverting young persons from the juvenile court process. The Committee
is also convinced that there should be an adequate response to the individual needs
of young persons and towards this end recommends provision in some instances
for mandatory assessments and for ongoing assessments at different stages in the
process. Other proposals reflect the Committee's belief that young persons and
their parents should be encouraged to participate at various stages in the process
and specifically should be entitled to make representations during the course of
proceedings. The Committee is also of the view that the legislation should provide
for substantive and procedural safeguards to protect the rights of young persons
throughout the process. In this regard, the proposals articulate the Committee's

belief that the authorities throughout the juvenile process should be held accountable for their decisions and actions through the provision of appeals, as well
as administrative and other judicial review processes.
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proceedings"; and s. 10(2) states that a "young person is entitled to be
assisted by any responsible person . . ." at all stages of the proceedings

"... except that he is not entitled to be represented at his trial by a person
who is not a lawyer unless the judge is satisfied that no lawyer is reasonably
available... ." The principal failing in this provision is that, in all proceedings,
the onus is on the young person himself to obtain counsel. Since most young
people would be under some stress at the outset of these proceedings which
would reduce their capacity to make reasoned decisions, and since many
would lack the sophistication to realize the advantages of retaining legal
counsel or the implications of not doing so, it would appear preferable, from
the young person's perspective, to make legal representation mandatory rather
than optional. Moreover, there is no point in having representation at trial
if the absence of counsel before trial has placed the young person in the
position of having given up most of his rights prior to this point in timeY0
The provision for representation "by any responsible person" signals the
importance which this proposed legislation attaches to the legal rights of
young persons. If young persons are to have the same "basic rights to fundamental freedoms" as adults, then surely they require equivalent legal representation as well. If "any responsible person" is unable to advise and represent
adequately the rights of an adult involved with the legal system, then this
person is no better able to provide a young person with legal advice and representation. To establish so ineffectual a protection and so inadequate an enforcement mechanism is, in effect, to deny young persons their basic legal
rights. 51
Some attempt is made to assist the young person in learning about and
enforcing his legal rights by providing him with a "youth worker." Sections
24 and 25 deal with the assignment and duties of the youth worker. The
worker is assigned to the young person as soon as he enters the system
whether it be by appearance notice, summons or arrest. The various duties
specified for the youth worker include explaining the youth's rights to him,
including his right to retain a lawyer, and assisting the young person in
asserting these rights.52 These provisions effectively create a form of para-legal
personnel. The youth worker performs many functions that counsel would
ordinarily be expected to perform. The probable effect of this section may be
to minimize the number of lawyers brought into the system. But this youth
worker cannot adequately replace independent legal counsel.
50 Even s. 10(3), which deals with the use in evidence against the young person
of a "written statement given by a young person to a peace officer or person in authority
over him," requires only that the statement have been given "in the presence of, a
lawyer, parent, adult relative or adult friend." At the risk of being trite, it might be
noted that adults who become involved in the criminal process frequently fail on their
own behalf to realize the implications of making such a statement.
51 A major factor in providing mandatory representation for children is obtaining
the requisite funding. While this consideration is recognized, financial constraints should
prove no more problematic in this regard than with respect to the other somewhat
costly recommendations arising from the proposals. See the discussion of possible
models, infra, note 103 et seq.
52
Supra, note 1, s. 25(1) (a).
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The following problems may arise from incorporating a youth worker
into this system. First, the young person may not see the youth worker as
an independent agent. He may instead be identified as part of the court structure and probably will be seen as someone "on the other side." Because of
this, the young person would be as unlikely to confide in him as he would in
independent legal counsel. The youth worker therefore may not be informed
of all the facts necessary to properly advise the young person of his legal rights.
Secondly, s. 2 defines "youth worker" to include persons appointed or
designated by the title of "probation officer." This, combined with the additional duties of the worker5 3 to supervise dispositions5 4 and to prepare predisposition reports, creates an inherently ambiguous role, particularly from
the perspective of a young person. The youth worker's role is defined in a
manner similar to the role presently filled by many duty counsel. Because
different parties in the proceedings will have different role expectations for
him, he is bound to experience considerable external role conflict. These conflicting pressures will make it difficult for him to advise the child in an independent and objective fashion.
Further, the youth worker's role is not clearly that of a defender of the
young person's rights. Rather he is to apprise the young person of his rights.
The worker's duties seem to require that he act in the overall best interests
of the youth, and this cannot necessarily be equated with what the youth may
be legally entitled to or want.
Fourthly, because the youth worker is not trained in the intricacies of
the law, he would not have sufficient technical knowledge to fill a role similar
to that of a lawyer in advising the child of his legal rights. Finally, the youth
worker has a vested interest in keeping the young person in the system. Since
his job is to advise young persons as they are being processed through this
system, the sooner they exit from the system, the less work exists for the youth
worker.
2.

Notice

Sections 6(1) and 6(2) provide that a parent, adult relative or adult
friend of a young person must be "notified" when the young person, by appearance notice, summons, warrant or arrest, is brought into the process,
unless the young person is over the age of sixteen and requests that such
notice not be given and, except where the young person is temporarily restrained elsewhere than a place of detention, a judge consents to the request.
Section 6(5) stipulates that the notice shall contain:
1) the substance of the charge against the young person;
5

3 These duties include: attending the youth court proceedings relating to the young
person; assisting the young person in complying with the conditions of any disposition;
assisting the young person prior to discharge or expiry of a disposition; and preparing
a pre-disposition report (s. 25(1) (b)-(e)).
54Under s. 23(1) (d), it is mandatory that a probation order contain a condition
"that the young person report to and be under the supervision of a parent, adult relative,
adult friend or youth worker, during the duration thereof." [emphasis added]
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2) the next step in the proceedings, if known;
3) the right of the young person or his parent to retain a lawyer;
4) the place where the young person is detained, if applicable, and the
name and address of the person in whose care he is.
Again, the importance accorded the legal rights of the young person is
reflected in the fact that nowhere in the Young Persons in Conflict with the
Law Act is any provision made to ensure that the young person himself
obtains such notice. Perhaps this is one of the functions of the youth worker,
although this is not explicitly stated in s. 25. Alternately, perhaps s. 40, which
states that provisions with respect to summary conviction proceedings in the
Criminal Code apply except to the extent that they are inconsistent with or
irrelevant to this Act, imports the requirement of notice. But s. 723 of the
Criminal Code states that proceedings for summary conviction offences are
commenced only by laying an information. Since the whole screening agency
process 55 may occur before an information is laid under this Act, s. 40 does
not adequately provide for notice to the young person. Thus, from the perspective of protecting the child's due process rights, the notice provisions appear
completely inadequate 86
The notice provisions also highlight a failure to appreciate the potential
dimensions of parent-child conflict. It is not clear why only those over sixteen
years of age can avail themselves of the opportunity to waive this notice to
others. "Parents have a right to be informed of the State's intervention in the
life of their child," suggests the Committee, "as does a child have a right to
have his parent so informed." [emphasis added] 5' There appears to be some
confusion here between legal rights and social conventions or mores. Further,
it is not clear why the child equally does not have the right not to have his
parents informed, given the potential disruptive effects such information may
have on family relationships.
3.

The Screening Agency

The Young Persons in Conflict with the Law Act provides in s. 9 that,
if the Attorney General or his agent so decides, the case may be referred to a
screening agency before an information is laid. The screening agency may
recommend that an information be laid, and then the matter proceeds at the
discretion of the Attorney General. 58 If, however, the screening agency recommends that no information be laid, then no information may be laid in respect
of any offence that is apparently disclosed by the facts before the screening
agency. Section 9(3) states that this agency is to be guided by the general
principle that:
55 Supra, note 1, s. 9. See infra, note 58 et seq.
56 Section 6(9) states that "[flailure alone to give a notice pursuant to this section
does not take away the jurisdiction of a judge to deal with the case, nor is such failure
alone a ground upon which a court may set aside a decision, finding or disposition or
order the release of a young person from custody."
57

Supra, note 1 at 24.

58Id., s. 9(5).
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[n1o information should be laid against a young person unless there are clear indications that the needs and the interests of the young person and of the public
cannot be adequately served without the use of procedures and facilities that are
available to the court.

Viewing this principle from another vantage point, one might translate the
preceeding section as follows:
A young person has no right to have a charge against him tried in a judicial forum
unless the screening agency so decides or unless they are unable to come to some

agreement with him which amounts to an admission of guilt.

In essence, s. 9 (4) indicates that the screening agency operates on a presumption of guilt. It must consider the seriousness and the circumstances of the
alleged offence.59 But if, in fact, no offence has been committed, these factors
are irrelevant. Further, it must consider the age, maturity, character and attitudes of the young person, including his willingness to make amends.80
Again, if no offence has been legally established, then such considerations are
beside the point. Similarly, why should a young person who has not been
demonstrated to be guilty of any offence be required to put forward plans for
his improvement or for changes in his conduct? 6' If, as the preamble states,
the young person has the same rights as an adult, then a primary right is the
right to be left alone, the right to be free from unwarranted official intervention. Not only do these provisions violate the child's right to privacy, but
the entire notion of a screening agency raises serious questions of possible
abuse.
Although the possible advantages of diverting young persons from youth
court proceedings are not to be denied, 62 comprehensive evaluation of the
various diversion programs has yet to be conducted. Similarly, while the
need to structure the discretion exercised by diversion agencies has been
acknowledged,64 the possible impact of diversion on the discretion exercised
by other personnel within the juvenile justice system, in particular by police
officers and judges, is not known. Conceivably, a diversion program could
result in more young persons being "officially processed." The police could
cease their policy of issuing simple "warnings" in many instances, viewing this
as the function of the diverting agency. Further, those young persons who do
eventually appear in court, after having been processed through diversion, will
no doubt be labelled as particularly "serious" cases by the very fact that they
appear in court, rather than having been previously diverted from the process.
59 Id., s. 9 (4) (a).
(0 Id., s. 9(4)(b).
61

Id., s. 9(4)(f).
See for example, Law Reform Commission of Canada, Diversion (Working
Paper No. 7, Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975); supra, note 1 at 26-27.
63 It has been suggested in this regard that the proponents of diversion have, in their
enthusiasm, over-estimated the "success" of their programs (F. E. Zimring, Measuring
the Impact of PretrialDiversion from the CriminalJustice System (1974), 41 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 224).
64
R. Barnhorst, S. Barnhorst and G. Thomson, The Frontenac Diversion Program:
Juvenile Court Committee Guidelines (unpublished document, Kingston: Family and
62

Juvenile Court, 1976).
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Inherent in the screening agency diversion proposal in the Young Persons
in Conflict with the Law Act is a danger that young persons innocent of the
offence charged will be dealt with unfairly. Short of convincing the screening
agency to recommend that no information be laid,6 5 or that no action be
taken, 6 both of which may be difficult given the presumption of guilt, the
innocent young person is faced with a dilemma. This screening process is, in
essence, a highly coercive procedure. A young person innocent of the charges
may be "better off" simply accepting the relatively mild penalties imposed by
the screening agency 67 rather than subjecting himself to the inconvenience,
stress, stigma and expense of a trial with the risk of an even greater penalty if,
at trial, he is found to have committed the offence. Parental pressure may
often force the young person to "go along with" the screening agency even
though he may not have committed the offence. These coercive elements in
the process are antithetical to the supposed contractual nature of the agreement between the screening agency and the young person. 8 Further, since the
Attorney General refers cases to the screening agency at his discretion, 9 this
process could be used as an outlet for "weak" cases that would not stand in a
court of law and would otherwise be dropped. Finally, although the record of
the screening agency proceedings cannot be used for any purpose, including
use in subsequent proceedings, without the consent of the young person,70 the
very fact that the screening agency has decided to lay an information, in view
of its guiding principle that no young person should go to trial unless the
public's needs and interests cannot be adequately served in another manner,
may prejudice the outcome of the trial. The negative "halo" effect is a well
known and easily demonstrated psychological phenomenon. 71 One more
readily makes negative inferences about a person previously associated with
other negative information. The negative connotation implicit in the screening agency's recommendation to proceed is not one that even a highly trained
judge may readily overcome. Thus, at trial, there will be a presumption of
guilt characteristic of the "crime control" model of criminal procedure.
In view of the coercive nature of the screening agency process and its
prejudicial implication at any subsequent trial, and because there is a need to
ensure that the conditions of any "agreement" are reasonable and acceptable
to the young person, adequate legal representation is essential in this forum.
While s. 10 allows the child to have representation at all stages of the proceedings, nothing in the draft Act ensures representation at this stage. Since
the young person does not have to consent prior to being ordered to appear
before the screening agency, and since the screening agency has power to
O5 Supra, note 1, s. 9(6).
661d., s. 9(8).
67 Id., s. 9(7).
68
1d. at 28. 'The intention is to permit the screening agency and the young person

to have an opportunity to agree on a mutually satisfactory basis what should be done
to resolve the situation at hand."
69

Id., s. 9 (2).

7Old., s. 9(9).
71 S. Rosenberg and K. Oishan, Valutive and Descriptive Aspects in Personality
Perception (1970), 16 J.of Personality and Social Psychology 619.
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place restrictions on his personal liberty7 and impose other penalty-like conditions, it can be argued that the functions of this agency are quasi-judicial
and hence governed by the rules of natural justice. The preamble of the Act
states that young persons have "a right to be heard in... the processes that

lead to decisions that affect them." This, combined with the "liberal construction" provisions of s. 3, the direction to the screening agency in s. 9 that it
"consider, in the light of the preamble, the facts of each case that is referred
to it .

.

. " and that it maintain a record of the proceedings are all factors

pointing to the judicial nature of this body.73 The screening agency therefore
has a duty to give a full and fair hearing. This implies that it has a duty to
give the young person adequate notice of the case he has to meet, to listen
to the young person and to reach a decision untainted by bias.
In several respects the role, philosophy, and procedures of the screening
agency parallel the present juvenile court functions and processes, and the
compelling reasons suggested as to the need for legal counsel in the present
juvenile court hearings are equally applicable to a hearing before the screening
agency.
4.

Adjudication, Finding, and Disposition
As previously stated, the young person, if represented at all at his trial,
must be represented by a lawyer "unless the judge is satisfied that no lawyer
is reasonably available, in which case the judge, upon the request of the young
person, may permit the young person to be assisted by anyone, except a youth
worker, whom the judge considers to be a responsible person." [emphasis
added]7 4 From the wording of ss. 10 and 11 it is clearly possible that the
young person could appear in court with no one to represent him, although
it can be argued that representation other than by legal counsel would be
equivalent to no representation at all. Section 11 (2) provides that the judge
shall not accept an admission of the offence by the young person unless the
young person has first had the opportunity to be assisted by some adult who
is, in the judge's opinion, capable of assisting him.75 A parent or adult friend
is not, however, capable of counselling a young person on whether or not he
has, in law, committed an offence. Many children who have committed an act
which lacks all the requisite elements of a Criminal Code offence may "feel"
guilty, and therefore admit to a crime which they have not, in law, committed.
Only proper legal counsel can provide adequate advice as to plea in this
situation.
Section 14 deals with the transfer of jurisdiction to adult court. A judge,
upon his own motion or upon application of the Attorney General, may, after
affording the young person an opportunity to be heard, transfer the case to
7

2 Lingley v. Hickman, [1972]

73

F.C. 171.

Howarth v. National Parole Board (1975), 50 D.L.R. (3d) 349 (S.C.C.); Re
Ontario Crime Commission; Ex parte Feeley and McDermott, [1962] O.R. 872 (C.A.).
74
Supra, note 1, s. 10(2).
75 A young person who makes such an admission without having had such an
opportunity is deemed for the purpose of s.-s. 15(2) not to have admitted the offence.
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adult court. Subsection (3) provides that a young person, over the age of
sixteen years, who would be tried by a judge and jury in adult court because
of the nature of the charge, can himself request that his case be transferred
to adult court. But without legal representation who will apprise the young
person of this right? Without legal representation who can help him weigh
the merits of such a decision? A person lacking legal training is unlikely to
be able to do so. Perhaps this is to be one of the duties of the youth worker,
although not explicitly so stated in s. 25. It has been suggested that "in many
respects, the problem of waiver (or transfer of cases to adult court) is the true
test of a juvenile court. '76 That is, transfer cases serve as indicators of how
far the courts are willing to go in allowing children access to the "benefits"
afforded by delinquency legislation. This is no less true of transfer proceedings
under the Young Personsin Conflict with the Law Act than under the Juvenile
Delinquents Act. It is therefore essential that the young person be advised of
the possible consequences of such a request on his part and that he have a
legal representative to speak to his right either to be tried under this special
legislation, or alternatively, to be tried in adult court by a judge and jury.
Section 15 deals with the actual adjudication of the charge. The standard
of proof required is the same as that applied in adult criminal proceedings proof beyond a reasonable doubt. However, s. 15(2) (b) allows the judge
to simply postpone making a finding and then to discharge the young person
under s. 16(1) (a) if he "is of the opinion that there is a reasonable likelihood that the appearance of the young person before the court will itself serve
the purposes of this Act, without making a finding that the young person committed the offence . . ." [emphasis added] Otherwise, under s. 16(1) (b),
the judge "may make a finding that the young person committed the offence"
7
and then dispose of the case in a manner set out in s. 16. 7
It should be noted that when the young person is deemed innocent, there
is no finding of not guilty; similarly, there is no finding of guilty when the
76 G. Parker, The Appellate Court View of the Juvenile Court (1969), 7 O.H.L.J.
155 at 166. In addition to the transfer cases cited, supra, note 18, see Re L.Y. (No. 1),
[1944] 3 D.L.R. 796 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Truscott (1959), 125 C.C.C. 100 (Ont. H. C.);
and R. v. Chamberlain (1974), 15 C.C.C. (2d) 379 (Ont. C.A.).
77
3Dispositions (s.16(1)(b)(i)-(vii)) include: payment of a fine (maximum two
hundred dollars); performance of an appropriate community service, possibly in conjunction with a monetary contribution to a charity (maximum two hundred dollars);
combination of previous dispositions (maximum four hundred dollars); placement on
probation (maximum three years; alone or in conjunction with open custody - written
reasons required); commitment to continuous or intermittent care and open custody
(maximum three unbroken years, alone or in conjunction with probation - only if
necessary having regard to factors in s. 9(4) - written reasons required); commitment
to continuous or intermittent care and secure custody (maximum three unbroken years
only if necessary having regard to factors in s. 9(4) or "to prevent the young person
from doing harm to himself or another or because he would be likely to escape if placed
in a place of care and open custody" supra, note 1 at 76 - written reasons required);
imposition of such reasonable conditions ancillary to commitment as the judge deems
advisable and in the best interests of the young person; and for an offence involving the
operation of a vehicle or vessel, etc., or an offensive weapon, a prohibition or restriction
on the operation in respect of the vehicle or vessel, etc., or possession or use of the
weapon (maximum two years).
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evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the young person did commit
the offence.
Herbert Packer has stated that the doctrine of legal guilt, that is, the
requirement that guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to an impartial
tribunal in a procedurally regular manner, is central to a due process model
of adjudication. 7 While the adjudication procedure under this Act adheres
to the principle of legal guilt, it avoids the practice of finding legal guilt. The
Committee's Report accompanying the draft legislation states that "[wie have
chosen not to use the words 'guilty' and 'not guilty' because of the elements
of criminal connotation and moral condemnation associated with these
terms.,79
There is evidence, however, that the concept of guilt is the one element
which young persons most clearly understand about the trial process.8 0 To
remove this for superficial and token public-relation purposes, when it may
have serious repercussions on the young person's perceptions of the fairness
of the process, is to remove the appearance of justice while obtaining no concomitant benefit. A major criticism leveled against the informal juvenile court
proceedings under the present Juvenile Delinquents Act is the blur which
often occurs between adjudication and disposition. The absence of a specific
finding, a concrete demarcation point in the hearing, will perpetuate this blur
and only increase confusion and misunderstanding of what is an already
complex procedure.
Section 40 of the Young Personsin Conflict with the Law Act states that
Part XXIV of the CriminalCode applies where not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. By this Part, the general rules of evidence are imported
into this forum. Here again, it is unrealistic to expect that anyone but a lawyer
could provide the child with adequate legal advice in so complex an area.
There is no provision in the Young Persons in Conflict with the Law Act
stipulating that the young person may not receive a longer sentence under a
youth court proceeding than he could receive if he were tried on the same
charge in adult court. Since a primary purpose of this proposed Act is to place
limits on the adult court-like elements of deterrence, punishment and detention in the youth court proceedings, 8 it is reasonable that such a provision
should be included.82 This is especially so if the rehabilitative aim of the
legislation is to be furthered, for it is patently unjust that a young person be
subject to restrictive measures for a longer period of time than an adult for
committing the same offence.
Since s. 10 states that the child should have legal representation "at
78
79
8

Supra, note 30.
Supra, note 1 at 141.

o Supra, note 37 at 16.

8

1 Supra, note 1 at 3.
Legislation that "benefits" young people by providing longer periods of incarceration for rehabilitative purposes has been held to be consistent with the Bill of
Rights (R. v. Burnshine (1974), 44 D.L.R. (3d) 584 (S.C.C.)).
82
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trial," this presumably includes the disposition phase of the hearing. However,
as with the adjudication, any other responsible adult may appear in certain
circumstances.83
5.

Pre-DispositionReports

Section 17(5) provides that a judge can direct that a "copy" of the predisposition report not be given to the young person or his parents when disclosure would be "seriously injurious" to the young person.8 4 However, if the
young person has a lawyer on the record, this lawyer is entitled to a copy of
the report. There is no provision which prevents the lawyer, or any other
person who receives a copy of the report, from disclosing its contents to the
child. This section may result in the child who is without legal counsel being
placed in a disadvantageous position, in that the judge could deny the child
or his representative access to the report, whereas he cannot deny it to a
young person's lawyer.
Any lawyer who obtains a copy of a negative report may, of necessity,
have to disclose some of its contents to the child in order to check its veracity.
Further, since the rules of evidence should be, under the proposed Act, as
applicable to disposition as they are to adjudication,85 it would be wrong for
a judge to consider evidence such as this without giving the child the right to
cross-examine, and to deny or challenge the contents of the report. A right of
cross-examination again underscores the importance of true legal representation.8 6
The pre-sentence report, by s. 17(6), forms part of the record of the
case. Surely the child should not be denied access to the entire record when an
appeal is allowed by s. 42 with respect to the disposition.87 By s. 39, the
contents of this report are made available to anyone "treating" the child; 88
with the judge's consent, to any peace officer where it is necessary for the investigation of an indictable offence;89 or to any other person whom the judge
considers to have a valid interest.90 The relative disadvantages of disclosing
a negative report to the child and his family must be weighed against the
possibility of creating a miasma of secrecy and mistrust concerning the report.
Whenever a report is withheld, the young person will know that the reason
for doing so is its negative contents. Can what he imagines or fears to be in it

83 For an excellent article on the importance of counsel at sentencing hearings, see
R. Fox and B. O'Brien, Fact-Findingfor Sentencers (1975), 10 Melb. U. L. Rev. 163.
84 See also supra, note 1, s. 39(1) (a) with respect to youth court records.
85This would, however, be contrary to the distinction proposed by Mr. Justice
Zuber in Re. P., supra, note 17. One juvenile and family court judge has emphasized
the equal importance of recognizing the rights of children at disposition as well as at
adjudication: G. Thomson, The Child in Conflict with Society (1973), 11 R. F. L. 257.
88 The right to effectively cross-examine the report of a medical examination under
s. 18 must also be safeguarded.
87
Supra, note 1, s. 39(1)(a).
88Id., s. 39(1)(e).
89 ld., s. 39(1) (f).
O ld., s. 39(1) (g).
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be any worse than the actual contents? Is the risk of creating such suspicion
and mistrust, with the resulting feeling of injustice, worth the price? We would
argue that it is not. The child may rightly feel that he is the victim of a conspiracy where everyone else can know the facts but him, and yet he is the one
who must endure the consequences.
Further, it is strongly advocated that there be a provision in the proposed
legislation for expunging the youth court record after a certain time period
has elapsed in which no further offences have been commtited. This record
would then be unavailable for any purpose, including proceedings under a
provincial training school act or further proceedings before the youth court.
6.

Review of Dispositionsand Appeals

Sections 30-34 provide for judicial review of dispositions. Section 33(1)
stipulates the grounds for review at the insistance of the young person or his
parent 9 l and s. 33(2) sets out the additional grounds upon which a judge,
provincial director or review agency can commence a review of the disposition.92 Since the review can result in a further deprivation of liberty for the
young person, 93 it should be a full natural justice hearing. The provisions of
s. 10 make legal representation optional at this hearing, but since further
punitive measures can be imposed, the need for counsel is as compelling here
as at trial.
Section 35 states that failure to comply with the disposition or a condition thereof is not an offence. Therefore, those seeking to show failure to
comply do not have to proceed via another trial process in which the young
person has the advantage of legal representation, the protection of the rules
of evidence and the necessity that there be proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Under the Juvenile Delinquents Act, as Fox and Spencer note, the judge has
91 That is:
(a) that he is being detained in a category of custody that was not directed in
the disposition,
(b) that he has been subjected to unreasonable restrictions in respect of probation

or custody,
(c) that he has made progress that justifies a change in the disposition,
(d) that he is not making satisfactory progress in respect of education, training
or otherwise,
(e) that the circumstances that led to him being committed to probation or care
and custody have changed materially,
(f) that services are available which were not available at the time when the
disposition was made or last reviewed, and
(g) such other grounds as the judge considers to be substantial and relevant.
92
That is:
(a) that the young person has failed to comply with a material condition of a
disposition or an order of probation,
(b) that the young person has repeatedly refused to comply with a reasonable
direction as to deportment from a youth worker or the young person's custodian,
(c) that the young person has evaded or attempted to evade custody, and
(d) such other grounds as the youth court judge considers to be substantial and
relevant.
031ld., s. 34(2).
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the option of considering "the new charge of delinquency as a fresh offence,
the determination of which calls for the formalities of arraignment, plea, and
adjudication and the application of evidentiary standards which exclude
hearsay; or he may treat the case as falling under s. 20(3) so that only a
dispositional issue arises, i.e., revision of the original sentence in light of
changed circumstances, in which event the consideration of hearsay evidence
may not be inappropriate." 94 Thus, s. 35 may be seen as a derogation of the
protection presently accorded the child under the Juvenile Delinquents Act.
Under s. 36(3), a young person or his parents may apply to the review
agency, if one is established in the province, for a review of the implementation of certain dispositions (probation, open custody, closed custody) "on
the grounds of serious deficiency ...relating to: a) the education or training
that the young person is being offered; b) the physical or mental health of
the young person; or c) the diet or the recreational or residential facilities
that are available to the young person." In such administrative review proceedings, the young person should equally have the benefit of legal representation as in any other proceeding under the Act. It should further be noted
that the young person may not have the option of such review at all if the
Lieutenant-Governor-in-Council of a province chooses not to establish such
an agency.
Section 42 provides for an appeal from the decision and the disposition
as of right. The only points of contention here relate to the potential inadequacy of the decision, in that no reasons or findings of fact are required
for some dispositions by s. 16(8) and the pre-disposition report, although
forming part of the record, may be withheld from the child and his parents.
7.

Age Provisions

The age jurisdiction of the youth court is dealt with in s. 4. Section 4(1)
states that the Act applies to federal offences committed by those over the age
of fourteen years but under the age of eighteen years.
The Solicitor General's Committee states that a variety of factors - developmental, social, behavioural and legal - were considered in formulating
the minimum and maximum age provisions. However, the basis of its decision
is not spelled out. Rather, it comments that "this is a very difficult matter to
resolve and does not lend itself to a purely objective analysis of an empirical
nature."95
The age provisions will be considered from two perspectives: that of
those under fourteen years who are presently covered by the Juvenile Delinquents Act but who will be excluded from the proposed Young Persons in
Conflict with the Law Act, and that of those sixteen years and over who are
presently covered by the Criminal Code provisions but who will be brought
within the compass of this draft legislation.
These proposals clearly deprive those under fourteen years of any of the
94
95

Supra, note 5 at 201.
Supra, note 1 at 19.
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rights and protections now accorded them through the case law developed
under the Juvenile Delinquents Act. As previously indicated, 96 in law a hearing under the Juvenile Delinquents Act must provide the child with many of
the due process rights and protections accorded an adult. By removing those
under fourteen years from the ambit of the proposed legislation, they are
left without any formally stated protections. If their rights are not formally
stated, and it is left to the provincial child welfare agencies to ensure their
protection, those under fourteen years may be denied almost all, if not all
the due process rights set out in the preamble to the Young Persons in
Conflict with the Law Act. Further, these children may no longer have access
to certain services presently provided through the juvenile court system.
This draft Act similarly curtails the legal rights of those young persons
sixteen years and over. Presently, they receive all the due process protections
accorded any other adult being processed through the criminal justice system.
By placing them within the jurisdiction of the youth court, many of their due
process rights are abrogated. As with those under fourteen, those sixteen and
over are placed in a less advantageous position under this proposed legislation.
Unless these individuals can be guaranteed the same rights under the
Young Persons in Conflict with the Law Act that they currently enjoy, then
they should not be removed from the jurisdiction of the adult court, even if it
is thought to be in their best interests that they not be dealt with in the adult
criminal justice system. Again, it must be emphasized that to act in an individual's best interests should not involve a derogation from the individual's
rights.
Even for those aged fourteen and fifteen years, it can be argued that the
Young Persons in Conflict with the Law Act provides few real improvements
over the Juvenile DelinquentsAct. It is only because the young person's right
to due process proceedings is seldom recognized under the Juvenile Delinquents Act that a new system is thought to be necessary. Yet to attain a
significant improvement the new system must provide both a greater recognition of rights for the young person and an effective means of enforcing these
rights. r The Young Persons in Conflict with the Law Act does not succeed
on either count.
That is not to say that the proposed legislation does not provide for
several specific and significant improvements in the Canadian juvenile justice
system. Many of these have been mentioned above. For example, s. 4(1)
limits the jurisdiction of the youth court to federal offences, thus eliminating
not only violations of provincial statutes and municipal by-laws, but also the
96 Supra, notes 11-22.
97 Other sections of the Young Persons in Conflict with the Law Act not dealt with
above include: s. 26, which continues the practice of holding proceedings without publicity, albeit in an altered form; s. 27(2) which provides for exclusion of the young
person from the proceedings under certain circumstances (again reinforcing the need
for an effective representative to remain at the proceedings and safeguard the young
person's rights); s. 28, which lists the legal effects of a finding or discharge; s. 37, which
places certain limitations on the fingerprinting and photographing of young persons; ss.
38 and 39 which cover the use of youth court records; and s. 5 which deals with detention not pursuant to a disposition.
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so-called "status" offences, from this forum. 9s Subject to the provisions of
adequate legal representation and controls on the exercise of discretionary
powers, a formalized diversion process may serve as a useful adjunct to the
youth court. The screening agency proposed in this draft Act is only one of
several possible methods of diversion.09
The proposed Act also introduces measures designed to structure the
exercise of judicial discretion and to secure elements of accountability in
certain phases of the proceedings. Section 14(2) lists six factors that a judge
must consider in forming an opinion as to whether the needs and interests of
the young person and the public require that the young person be proceeded
against in adult court, although the effectiveness of this specification is limited
by allowing the judge to have regard to "any other factor he deems relevant."
Section 14(4) requires that a judge file written reasons for his decision to
transfer a case. This at least provides the young person with same justification
for such a course of action. Further, s. 16 places limits on the various dispositions available to a youth court judge by providing for definite rather than
indeterminate custodial sentences; by restricting a judge's discretion to
sentence a young person to secure custody; and by requiring the judge, for
the more "serious" dispositions, to have regard to the same factors as specified
for the screening agency under s. 9(4), and to file written reasons for the
disposition. Similarly, s. 23 lists certain mandatory conditions to appear in a
probation order and leaves certain specified others to the judge's discretion,
although the option of imposing any other "reasonable condition" reduces
this section's effectiveness. Again, subject to controls on the exercise of discretion, judicial'0 0 and administrativeA0' review of dispositions may prove a
valuable check on the "treatment" process. Finally, the provision under s. 42
for appeal as of right from a decision under s. 15(2), a finding of insanity,
or a disposition under ss. 16 or 34 eliminates the need to apply for leave to
appeal, as required by s. 37 of the Juvenile Delinquents Act, and hence facilitates review of youth court proceedings.
These piecemeal improvements do not, however, justify any derogation
from the procedural rights of those under eighteen years of age in legal proceedings. We have argued that while the Young Persons in Conflict with the
Law Act purports to recognize and give effect to procedural rights and substantive safeguards for young persons in the court process, the proposals in
effect detract from many of the rights and safeguards currently accorded to
young persons under the Juvenile Delinquents Act. Central to this failure to
substantiate the claims of the preamble is the inadequacy of the provisions
for legal representation. The draft Act "entitles" the young person to retain
98

Under s. 2 of the Juvenile Delinquents Act, "juvenile delinquent" includes a child
"who is guilty of sexual immorality or any similar form of vice, or who is liable by
reason of any other act to be committed to an industrial school or juvenile reformatory
under any federal or provincial statute."
99 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Studies on Diversion (Ottawa: Information
Canada, 1975).
1o Supra, note 1, s. 30.
101 Id., s. 36.
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legal counsel. The onus is on the young person to take action in this regard,
on his own initiative, at a timely stage of the proceedings. The interjection of
a para-legal youth worker into this scheme is not adequate to remedy its lack
of sensitivity to the legal needs of the young person in conflict with the law.
To do no more than state that a child has a right to legal representation at
youth court hearings is far from being novel or sufficient. The draft Act lacks
a concrete proposal for a system that would facilitate access of young persons
to legal counsel at all stages of the proceedings.
The Report of the Solicitor General's Committee indicates that this shortcoming was not a mere oversight. While "the desirability of a provision in the
legislation requiring that legal services be made available to young persons
unable to make their own arrangements for such assistance

. .

." was con-

sidered, the Committee concluded that "this matter . . concerns more the
availability of legal services and funds and a provision in legislation would not
alone be sufficient to ensure the development or availability of these resources."'102 The Committee thereby avoided the real issue, which appears to
be federal unwillingness to finance federal proposals. It could be argued, however, that because administration of the courts is a provincial responsibility,
it would be incumbent upon the provinces to provide the funds necessary to
ensure that representation was available under the proposed legislation. Unless
some system of cost-sharing can be worked out, it is likely that the recommendations for legal representation for children will remain as mere recommendations. A review of various systems and proposals will highlight the
advantages and disadvantages of different models and suggest directions that
might be pursued in ensuring effective legal representation for children.
D.

SYSTEMS FOR LEGAL REPRESENTATION

Full legal representation for children in court proceedings has been the
subject of a number of recent proposals, some of which have been implemented in legislation. In Canada, the British Columbia Royal Commission on
Family and Children's Law has recommended that children be given the right
to legal assistance in all decisions affecting their guardianship, custody or a
determination of their status.'03 Consistent with these ends, it was proposed
that the position of "family advocate" be continued in order to provide representation for the child and others, and to protect the child's interests by advocating resolutions put forth in the child's "best interests."'10 4 By s. 8 of
British Columbia's Unified Family Court Act, 0 5 provision is made for the
appointment of lawyers as family advocates, with the power, notwithstanding
any other Act, to:
a) attend a proceeding in a court respecting a family matter or a matter respecting
the delinquency of a child;
102 Id.at 33.
103 Fifth Report of the Royal Commission on Family and Children's Law, Part II,
Children's Rights (Vancouver: Queen's Printer, 1975) at 7.
104 Fifth Report of the Royal Commission on Family and Children's Law, Part VI,
Custody, Access and Guardianship,(Vancouver: Queen's Printer, 1975) at 33.
105 S.B.C. 1974, c. 99, as am. by S.B.C. 1975, c. 4; S.B.C. 1976, c. 2, s. 33.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL.. 15, NO. 1

b) intervene at any stage in a proceeding under clause (a) for the purpose of
acting as counsel for a child who, in the opinion of the family advocate or the
court, requires representation by counsel; and
c) upon the request of a court, assist any party to a proceeding under clause (a)
who is not represented by counsel.' 06

The role of the family advocate does not conform to a true adversary
model of legal representation. 07 The lawyer may be called upon in a proceeding to assist parties other than the child. Further, the family advocate's intervention is at his own, or at the court's, discretion. Thus, a single system for
both "family matters" and "delinquency" proceedings may not be the optimal
method for providing children with effective legal representation. In particular,
the child should be provided with independent legal representation as of right
in delinquency proceedings.
A recent Alberta study 08 on the question of legal representation for
children indicated that a pilot project duty counsel program was presently
being conducted in its juvenile courts through the legal aid system."' How
this project compares with other duty counsel programs was not specified.
For other proceedings, although the B.C. family advocate approach was
favoured,"10 it was felt that this approach would not be feasible in Alberta
for some time, and therefore it was recommended that an office of Amicus
Curiae be established. Under this system, the court appoints, at the request
of the parties or on its own initiative, a person to represent the infant, and to
make recommendations on the basis of investigations to the court. The amicus
curiae may commission social work and psychiatric investigations and call
evidence to provide the court with an impartial opinion as to the child's best
interests."' It was further recommended that intervention by this officer of
the court to represent the child be made mandatory "in all cases of abuse or
neglect as well as all cases involving a dispute as to custody, access or
guardianship, while giving the courts a large measure of discretion in all other
cases." 1 2 Presumably then, although representation would be as of right in
some proceedings, it would be discretionary in delinquency proceedings. How
this system would relate to the duty counsel program is not specified.
The Ontario Law Reform Commission has recommended that the Office
of the Law Guardian be established as part of the support services for the
family court."13 The amicus curiae role envisioned for the Law Guardian
10

6
Id., s. 8(2).
'0 7 Three main orientations to legal representation for juveniles in delinquency
proceedings have been documented: legalistic (adversary role), amicus curiae (neutral,
advisory role) and social work (role of helping the child) (see supra, note 41; and
Stapleton and Teitlebaum, supra, note 27, chapter 1.

108 S. McKeown, Representationof the Infant in Legal Proceedings -

Who Speaks

for the Child? (unpublished paper. Edmonton: Alberta Institute of law Research and
Reform, 1976).
109 Id. at 2.
110 Id. at 36-37.
111

1d.
1121Id.
113 Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Family Law. Part V: Family

Courts (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1974) at 75.
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would involve his intervention in proceedings to assert and protect the rights
of children and to provide an independent opinion on the best interests of the
child. A Law Guardian would represent children in delinquency proceedings." 4 In the context of protection proceedings, the Commission emphasized
that it did not have
it in mind that the Law Guardian should take a strict adversary position in
the proceedings. All who have written on this subject have been at pains to point
out that conusel for the child should adopt the stance of an amicus curiae rather
than that of an aggressive advocate intent only on destroying the evidence of
parents or of a child welfare agency. This is as it should be. The child's advocate
should be constructive rather than destructive if he is to be of use to the child
and to the court.11 5
...

We have characterized the role of an amicus curiae as essentially a compromise posture for the lawyer in delinquency proceedings." 6 This type of
representation requires the lawyer to assume a neutral rather than adversary
position. He is concerned with advising the court as to all the available
evidence relevant to a determination of the child's best interests. In delinquency proceedings, however, the child's representative must be sufficiently
independent to reject a proposal as to the child's best interests should this
involve a sacrifice of the child's legal rights. The amicus curiae does not meet
this essential requirement. This type of representation would seem better
suited to proceedings involving children that are of a less adversarial nature.
The Ontario Law Reform Commission did not consider the effect of
the proposed Law Guardian on the present duty counsel system. Presumably,
the need for duty counsel would be eliminated. As stated, the Ontario duty
counsel system has a number of deficiencies. 1 7 Communication between the
lawyer and the child prior to delinquency proceedings is brief and inadequate.
Duty counsel have not been able to function as effective advocates in this
forum. As a result, the legal rights of children have often been ignored. This
is not to say that all systems of representation involving duty counsel need
suffer from such defects.
In 1974, the Task Force Report on legal aid in Ontario" 8 recommended
that legal aid should be available as of right to those financially eligible, including infants, in respect of proceedings or proposed proceedings in a Provincial Court (Family Division),"x9 but no steps have been taken to implement this recommendation. Its report did not attempt an examination of the
sufficiency of, and need for, legal representation for children. Hence, Ontario
has progressed little since the implementation of the duty counsel system ten
years ago in providing effective representation for children.
The Committee on the Family Court of the Quebec Civil Code Revision
14 Id. at 76.
115 Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Family Law. Part III: Children
(Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1973) at 129-30.
16 Supra, notes 40 and 107.
117 Supra, note 32 et seq.

118 Report of the Task Force on Legal Aid (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1974).
119 Id. at 41-42.
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Office has recognized "that the presence of a lawyer at the Family Court constitutes a necessary means for protecting the rights of the parties concerned,
ensuring respect of the rules governing the evidence given before the court,
assisting the judge in his choice and appreciation of pertinent facts, and helping the parties to better understand, and even accept, the decision taken. 1 20
To this end, it recommended that "every person before the Court be entitled
to retain the services of the lawyer of his choice, or to make use of the services
provided under the Legal Aid Act if he is entitled thereto . ..,,121 and "that
every child involved in proceedings before the Family Court be entitled to
legal aid services if he so desires, if his parents so request and cannot meet
the legal costs involved or if the judge, the mediator or the Admission Service,
12 2
assigns propria motu, a legal advisor, or a lawyer to that child.
This proposal does not outline the method by which the child is to be
apprised of this right. Nor are methods for facilitating communication between
the lawyer and the child suggested. A major fault of duty counsel programs
is that they often amount to "too little - too late."
Attempts to overcome such shortcomings have been instituted in Manitoba. The Regulations 2m under The Legal Aid Services Society of Manitoba
Act 2 4 state:
JUVENILE COURT DUTY COUNSEL
57. Duty counsel, who shall be solicitors, may be appointed by the board, on a
part-time or full-time basis, to attend at one or more Juvenile Courts in the
province.

58. The board may appoint graduates-at-law to assist duty counsel as permitted
by law.
59. Duty counsel assigned to a Juvenile Court shall
a) provide information to the general public, and in particular to minors,
about the law as it relates to minors;
b) advise children who have been charged, or who may be charged, with
delinquencies under the Juvenile Delinquents Act;
c) subject to this regulation, and in his discretion, represent children in
Juvenile Court proceedings, or arrange, through the office of the area
director, for the appointment of solicitors, in accordance with this regulation, to represent children charged with delinquencies; and
d) advise and assist adult persons charged, or liable to be charged, under
the Juvenile Delinquents Act, including taking applications for legal aid.

By extending the duties of juvenile court duty counsel beyond the occasion
of the child's actual appearance in juvenile court, representation may become
120 Quebec Civil Code Revision Office, Committee on the Family Court, Report
on the Family Court (Montreal: Quebec Official Publisher, 1975) at 128.
2
1 1 Id. at 129.
122 Id. at 129 and 132.
123 Manitoba Gazette (1972), 101 (32) at 285.
124 S.M. 1971, c. 76.
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timely, and increased opportunity would be available for communicating with
the child. Under this scheme, however, representation for the child at court
proceedings is still not as of right.
Other proposals for systems of legal representation for children have
emanated from non-Canadian jurisdictions. Since 1962, a Law Guardian
system has been in effect in New York State.125 Section 241 of the New York
Family Court Act

26

provides:

This act declares that minors who are the subject of family court proceedings
should be represented by counsel of their own choosing or by law guardians. This
declaration is based on a finding that counsel is often indispensible to a practical
realization of due process of law and may be helpful in making reasoned determinations of fact and proper orders of disposition. This part establishes a
system of law guardians for minors who often require the assistance of counsel
to help protect their interests and to help them express their wishes to the court.
Nothing in this act is intended to preclude any other interested person from
appearing by counsel.

At the request of a minor or his parent, the court must appoint a Law
Guardian to represent the minor if independent legal representation is not
available. 2 7 A tri-partite function was envisioned for the lawyer. He was to
serve as the defender of the child's rights, the protector of the general welfare
of the child, and the conveyor of information to the child and his parents on
the functioning of the court.12 8 Lawyers have encountered difficulties, how9
ever, in attempting to perform all of these functions concurrently.2
More recently, the Australian Family Law Act 1975130 has, by s. 65,
provided for separate representation of children in custody disputes, at the
discretion of the court:
65. Where, in proceedings with respect to the custody, guardianship or maintenance of, or access to, a child of a marriage, it appears to the court that
the child ought to be separately represented, the court may, of its own motion,
or on the application of the child or of an organization concerned with the
welfare of children or of any other person, order that the child be separately
represented, and the court may make such other orders as it thinks necessary
for the purpose of securing such separate representation.

As indicated above, we would argue that although such independent legal
representation may be suited to custody proceedings, the adversarial nature
25
See J. Isaacs, The Lawyer in Juvenile Court (1968), 10 Crim. L.Q. 222; J.
1
Isaacs, The Role of the Lawyer in Representing Minors in the New Family Court
(1962), 12 Buffalo L. Rev. 501.
2
1 6 L. 1962, c. 686, as am. by L. 1970, c. 962.
12 7 Isaacs, supra, note 125.
1 28
supra, note 125.
Isaas, The Role of the Lawyer ....

129

Isaacs, The Lawyer in Juvenile Court, supra, note 125 at 232.

180 No. 53 of 1975.
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providing children with access to
of delinquency proceedings necessitates
11
suitable legal counsel as of right.
Two other recommendations with regard to legal representation are also
noteworthy. The Law Reform Commission of Canada 3 2 has recommended
that children be provided with independent legal representation in divorce
proceedings when parents are disputing custody or when a judge or other
official considers such representation necessary. And finally, an English report
by the Justice Committee on ParentalRights and Duties and Custody Suits' 83

has recommended that the position of "Children's Ombudsman" be established. In their own words:
The role we envisage for the Children's Ombudsman includes that of a clearing
agency, one branch at each family court. Everyone would know of his existence
and would be expected to report to him. All relevant information would end up
under one hand. He would have the power to request a welfare report whenever
he thought it necessary. On behalf of a child the subject of a custody suit, he
would act as the child's spokesman and would have the duty of instructing
solicitors and counsel to represent this child's interests so that the interests of the
child might be separately represented to the court independently of the adults and
local or other authorities concerned. (He would have the power to do so in other
legal proceedings as well.) As the child's spokesman, it would be his particular
duty to ensure that the views of any child able to express them, verbally or otherwise, were ascertained in the absence of the parents or other adult "custodian"
and then made known to the tribunal. He would be responsible to the Lord
Chancellor (the traditional delegate of the Crown as parens patriae).134

The matter of legal representation for children has, then, generated
considerable attention among those concerned with the position and rights
of children in court proceedings. Analysis of the various legislative provisions
' 3 1 Three recent Supreme Court of Ontario cases are relevant to representation in
this context. In Reid and Reid (1976), 11 O.R. (2d) 622 (Ont. Div. Ct., per Galligan
J.), the Official Guardian was appointed as the guardian ad litem of three children, "with
full power to act for the infants as though they were parties" to the custody proceedings.
In Rowe v. Rowe (unreported decision, February 2, 1976, Ont. H. C., per Reid J.) two
children, the subjects of a custody dispute in the context of divorce proceedings, were
represented by their own private counsel, although "grave misgivings" were expressed
as to the desirability of such a procedure. Finally, in Re Helmes (unreported decision,
August 10, 1976, Ont. Div. Ct., per Morand J.) it was held that, in the context of protection proceedings under the Child Welfare Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 64, as amended a
judge of the Provincial Court (Family Division) could not order that the Official
Guardian be appointed to act as guardian ad litim of the child. However, "if the judge
is concerned as to whether the interests of the child are being properly protected the
judge hearing the case would have the right to adjourn the matter, contact the Official
Guardian and ask him if he wished to make representations. It would then be up to the
Official Guardian if he wished to make representation. By virtue of (s. 25(3)) the Judge
might then hear the Official Guardian on behalf of the child." Whether representation
in this manner is sufficient in custody or neglect proceedings will no doubt receive attention elsewhere. We have argued, however, that independent representation provided
in a systematic manner is required in delinquency proceedings.
32
1
Law Reform Commission of Canada, Divorce (Working Paper No. 13, Ottawa:
Information Canada) at 48-50.
183 Justice Committee, Parental Rights & Duties and Custody Suits (London:
Stevens and Sons, 1975).
184 Id. at 40.
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and proposals suggests that an adequate system for legal representation of
children in delinquency proceedings minimally demands:
1) that the child be entitled to independent representation by a lawyer
as of right;
2) that access of the child to such representation be facilitated;
3) that contact be made between the child and his representative at an
early stage in the juvenile justice process;
4) that the child's waiver of legal representation be carefully scrutinized
to safeguard against the exercise of undue influence by parents and
others to expedite the proceedings;
5) that the representative undertake to protect the legal rights of the
child as his primary function;
6) that the representative have some knowledge and appreciation of the
philosophy and goals that underlie the special processing of young
persons; and
7) that the representative be skilled in communicating with children.
While a number of questions remain as to the child - lawyer relationship,
both in terms of the child's capacity and ability to instruct counsel and in
terms of the lawyer's role as both an advocate for the child and as an officer
of the Court, it is imperative that efforts be initiated to safeguard the rights
of young persons in conflict with the law.

